Fictitious play in networks by Ewerhart, Christian & Valkanova, Kremena
  
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 239 
 
 
Fictitious Play in Networks 
 
 
 
 
 
Christian Ewerhart and Kremena Valkanova 
 
 
 
December 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Zurich 
 
Department of Economics 
 
 
 
Working Paper Series 
  
ISSN 1664-7041 (print) 
 ISSN 1664-705X (online) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1Fictitious Play in Networks2
Christian Ewerhart* Kremena Valkanova**3
December 6, 20164
Abstract. This paper studies ctitious play in networks of noncooperative two-player games. We5
show that continuous-time ctitious play converges to Nash equilibrium provided that the overall6
game is zero-sum. Moreover, the rate of convergence is 1= , regardless of the size of the network.7
In contrast, arbitrary n-player zero-sum games do not possess the ctitious-play property. As an8
extension, we consider networks in which each bilateral game is strategically zero-sum, a weighted9
potential game, or a two-by-two game. In those cases, convergence requires either a condition on10
bilateral payo¤s or that the underlying network structure is acyclic. The results are shown to11
hold also for the discrete-time variant of ctitious play, which entails a generalization of Robinsons12
theorem to arbitrary zero-sum networks. Applications include security games, conict networks, and13
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1. Introduction1
Fictitious play (Brown, 1949, 1951; Robinson, 1951) refers to a class of simple and intuitive models2
of learning in games. The common element of such models is that a player is imagined to respond3
optimally to an evolving belief on the behavior of his opponents, where the players belief at any point4
in time is formed on the basis of the empirical frequencies of strategy choices made by his opponents5
up to that point in time. Understanding the conditions under which ctitious play converges to Nash6
equilibrium is important because such results help to clarify the intuition that equilibrium play may7
be reached even if players are not perfectly rational.1 While variants of ctitious play are known8
to converge in large classes of two-player games, the case of n-player games has been explored to a9
much lesser extent.210
This paper studies the dynamics of ctitious play in general classes of network games. We11
rst consider what we call zero-sum networks (Bregman and Fokin, 1987, 1998; Daskalakis and12
Papadimitrou, 2009; Cai and Daskalakis, 2011; Cai et al., 2016). These are multiplayer zero-sum13
games that can be represented as a network of two-player games. This class of games is actually quite14
large and includes practically relevant examples of resource allocation games such as generalized15
Blotto and security games. We show that the Lyapunov methods of Hofbauer (1995) and Harris16
(1998) can be extended to the class of zero-sum networks. Specically, the Lyapunov function17
considered in the present paper aggregates, across all players in the network, the maximum payo¤18
that could be obtained by optimizing against the empirical frequency distribution of prior play.19
This function converges to zero at rate 1=t on any continuous-time ctitious-play (CTFP) path, and20
regardless of the size of the network. In particular, CTFP converges to equilibrium in any zero-sum21
network. However, as we also show with an example, arbitrary n-player zero-sum games do not22
possess the ctitious-play property, i.e., the network assumption is crucial.23
To gauge the role of the zero-sum assumption, we consider three additional classes of network24
games. First, we look at networks of strategically zero-sum games, or conict networks.3 Thus,25
1The literature on ctitious play is too large to be surveyed here. For an introduction to the theory of learning in
games, see Fudenberg and Levine (1998). The literature on learning in social networks has recently been surveyed by
Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2011). For a concise discussion of epistemic vs. dynamic foundations of Nash equilibrium,
see Krishna and Sjöström (1997).
2Positive convergence results for n-players have been established, in particular, for games solvable by iterated
dominance (Milgrom and Roberts, 1991), games with identical interests (Monderer and Shapley 1996b; Harris, 1998),
and various classes of star-shaped network games (Sela, 1999). Jordan (1993) has shown that ctitious play need not
converge in a non-zero-sum three-player game. See also Gaunersdorfer and Hofbauer (1996).
3Recent papers that look at conict networks include Bozbay and Vesperoni (2014), Dziubin´ski et al. (2016a),
1
each bilateral game in the network is assumed to be best-response equivalent in mixed strategies1
to a zero-sum game. Moulin and Vial (1978) noted that ctitious play converges in this class of2
two-player games. In networks of conicts, CTFP converges as well, provided that valuations in the3
bilateral games satisfy a condition that we call pairwise homogeneity of valuations. This assumption is4
satised, for example, in transfer networks considered by Franke and Öztürk (2015). When valuations5
are heterogeneous, however, convergence need not hold in general. Intuitively, the aggregation of6
bilateral payo¤s does not commute with the strategic equivalence because the payo¤ transformations7
that turn two di¤erent bilateral games into zero-sum games need not be identical. We illustrate this8
fact with a surprisingly simple example in the spirit of Jordan (1993). But convergence can still9
be obtained with heterogeneous valuations when the underlying network structure is acyclic, i.e., a10
disjoint union of trees.411
Next, we assume that bilateral games are weighted potential games. Applications include channel12
selection problems in wireless communication networks, and the spreading of ideas and technologies13
over social networks, for instance. Extending the analysis of Cai and Daskalakis (2011), it is shown14
that CTFP converges to equilibrium in any network of exact potential games. However, as we show15
with still another example, ctitious play need not converge in general networks of weighted poten-16
tial games. Instead, in a somewhat unexpected analogy, the convergence result holds for weighted17
potential games under the condition that the underlying network structure is acyclic. Finally, by18
combining our ndings for conict networks with pairwise homogeneous valuations and for net-19
works of exact potential games, we obtain a generalization of Miyasawas (1961) theorem to network20
games on arbitrary graphs. As additional extensions, the paper looks at discrete-time ctitious play21
(DTFP), generalizing Robinsons (1951) famous result for two-person zero-sum games to arbitrary22
n-player zero-sum networks, and at the possibility of correlated beliefs which is a relevant aspect in23
multiplayer games.24
As a contribution of potentially independent interest, we substantially simplify the Lyapunov25
approach to CTFP in two-player zero-sum games introduced by Hofbauer (1995) and Harris (1998).26
That approach has traditionally combined the envelope theorem with the theory of di¤erential in-27
Franke and Öztürk (2015), Huremovic (2016), Jackson and Nei (2015), König et al. (2015), Kovenock et al. (2015),
amongst others. For a survey, see Dziubin´ski et al. (2016b).
4E.g., any star-shaped network considered by Sela (1999) is acyclic, but the network shown in Figure 1 below is not
acyclic.
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clusions, where the former part is fairly simple (cf., e.g., Krishna and Sjöström, 1997), while the1
latter part is quite hairy (cf. Harris, 1998, Sec. 5-6). Driesen (2009) proposed an alternative way to2
simplify the proof by relating to the general belief a¢ rmation result of Monderer et al. (1997), yet3
at the cost of assuming that players choose pure strategies, which might interfere with existence (cf.4
Harris, 1998, p. 242).5 In our derivation of the convergence result, however, no additional assump-5
tions are imposed. In fact, the technical apparatus of di¤erential inclusions is entirely dropped and6
replaced by elementary considerations. The brevity of the argument will become apparent from the7
proof of Proposition 1 below.68
Related literature. The rst paper studying ctitious play in an environment similar to ours is9
Sela (1999). His observation was that some of the convergence results for two-player games generalize10
quite easily to n-player games with a one-against-allstructure. In that setting, one player located11
in the center of the star-shaped network chooses a compound strategy that is the same in every12
bilateral interaction. The crucial point to note is then that the network game can be transformed13
into a two-player game in which the choices of the non-centered players are orchestrated by a single14
agent that maximizes the sum of the payo¤s of all the non-centered players. Under a specic tie-15
breaking rule, the DTFP process in the reduced game turns out to be identical, for any given initial16
condition, to the DTFP process in the one-against-allgame. Thereby, the ctitious-play property17
in the network game can be established as a corollary of results for two-person games provided that18
the bilateral games are all of the same type, like zero-sum, identical payo¤, or two-by-two. It is,19
however, not immediate to see how this trick could be generalized to networks that are not star-20
shaped. The present paper extends the results of Sela (1999) to general network structures. We also21
drop the tie-breaking rule, and deal more explicitly with the case of CTFP.22
An interesting recent strand of literature, related to the interdisciplinary eld of algorithmic23
game theory, has taken up the study of networks of two-player games, where it is assumed that each24
players payo¤ is the sum of payo¤s obtained in the bilateral games with neighboring players.7 Cai25
et al. (2016) have claried how far results traditionally known only for two-person zero-sum games26
5See also Shamma and Arslan (2004) for a unifying presentation of existing Lyapunov arguments in a set-up with
a soft-maxbest-response function.
6However, di¤erential inclusions will still be used to prove existence of a CTFP, as well as for the analysis of the
discrete-time variant of ctitious play.
7Network games have, of course, a long tradition in game theory. See, e.g., the recent survey by Bramoullé and
Kranton (2016), and references given therein.
3
(such as solvability by a linear program, existence of a value, equivalence of max-min and equilibrium1
strategies, exchangeability of Nash equilibria, and the relationship to coarse correlated equilibrium)2
can be extended to zero-sum network games. Moreover, in that class of games, discrete-time no-3
regret learning algorithms converge to Nash equilibrium (Daskalakis and Papadimitriou, 2009; Cai4
and Daskalakis, 2011).8 Another natural class of network games is dened by the requirement that, in5
each bilateral game, both players have identical payo¤ functions (Cai and Daskalakis, 2011).9 Under6
the condition that pairwise interactions are games with identical payo¤s, the network game is shown7
to possess an exact potential, which implies that in that class of games, certain learning algorithms8
converge to equilibrium. In particular, the discrete dynamics of pure best responses converges to a9
Nash equilibrium. However, these contributions do not discuss any ctitious-play dynamics.10
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains preliminaries. The CTFP11
property of zero-sum networks is established in Section 3. Section 4 deals with additional classes of12
games. DTFP is considered in Section 5. Section 6 discusses the case of correlated beliefs. Section13
7 concludes.14
2. Preliminaries15
2.1 Network games16
There is a nite set V = f1; :::; ng of players (countries, rms, consumers, political institutions,...).1017
Let E  V  V be a set of bilateral relationships. Any two agents i; j 2 f1; :::; ng are either in18
interaction ((i; j) 2 E) or not in interaction ((i; j) =2 E). Thus, the pair (V;E) is a graph, and we19
assume that it is (i) undirected (8i; j : (i; j) 2 E , (j; i) 2 E), and (ii) irreexive (8i : (i; i) =2 E).1120
Each edge (i; j) 2 E represents a nite two-person game Gij between players i and j, with strategy21
set Sij for player i, strategy set Sji for player j, payo¤ function uij : Sij  Sji ! R for player i,22
8 In a no-regret learning process, aggregate historical payo¤s are asymptotically not below optimal payo¤s achievable
against historical frequency distributions. An example is the multiplicative-weights adaptive learning algorithm of
Freund and Schapire (1999). For additional background, see the monograph of Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi (2006).
9This class includes, e.g., binary coordination games, as considered by Bramoullé and Kranton (2016, Prop. 3). See
also Bramoullé et al. (2014) and Bourlès et al. (2015). For early uses of potential methods in network models, see
Blume (1993) and Young (1993).
10Finiteness of the network looks essential to the convergence of ctitious play. However, we have not looked
specically into this issue. Blume (1993) studies the strategic interaction of players that are located on an innite
lattice. Morris (2000) considers best-response dynamics in locally nite networks of coordination games.
11While the underlying network structure is assumed to be exogenous, our set-up is consistent with the view that
players strategically choose a subset of their neighbors as (potential) partners (see, e.g., Jackson, 2005). Along these
lines, the dynamic evolution of a network is subsumed as well.
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and payo¤ function uji : Sji  Sij ! R for player j.12 Choices made in the bilateral games (or edge1
games) will be referred to as bilateral strategies.2
3
Figure 1. A network game.4
Let N(i) = fj : (i; j) 2 Eg denote the set of neighbors of player i. Figure 1 provides an5
illustration of a network with three players, each of them playing against two neighbors. Note that6
the number of neighbors of a player corresponds to the players degree as a node in the network7
of interactions. In the example, the network is complete, but this is not assumed.13 Denote by8
? 6= Xi  j2N(i)Sij the set of multilateral strategies of agent i (defense policies, trade quotas,9
promotional strategies, prices, invitation or acceptance of friendship, etc.). It is important to note10
that we allow for Xi ( j2N(i)Sij , which will be the interesting case in most applications. For11
example, there could be budget constraints, limited resources (e.g., planes in a military conict), or12
the need for price coherence across platforms.1413
For a given multilateral strategy xi 2 Xi of player i, we denote by j(xi) = sij 2 Sij the14
corresponding bilateral strategy vis-a-vis player j. Going over all neighbors of player i, we see15
that any multilateral strategy xi 2 Xi may be considered as a vector of bilateral strategies xi =16
fsijgj2N(i) = fj(xi)gj2N(i). Conversely, the set of proles composed of multilateral strategies17
12Thus, Gij and Gji refer to the same game, yet in the rst case from player is perspective, and in the second case
from player js perspective. Note also that the rst argument in a bilateral payo¤ function uij always refers to player
is strategy. E.g., even in the expression u21(s21; s12), strategy s21 is player 2s bilateral strategy vis-a-vis player 1, and
s12 is player 1s bilateral strategy vis-a-vis player 2.
13We shall use the standard terminology of graph theory (see, e.g., Bollobás, 2013). Thus, a network (V;E) is
complete if N(i) = V nfig for all i = 1; :::; n; it is called acyclic when there is no nite sequence of pairwise distinct
players i1; :::; i 2 V with   3 such that (i1; i2) 2 E, (i2; i3) 2 E,..., (i 1; i) 2 E, and (i; i1) 2 E; a network is
star-shaped if there is a player i such that N(i) = V nfig and such that N(j) = fig for any j 6= i; nally, a network is
called connected if, for any i and j with i 6= j, there is a nite sequence i1; i2; :::; i 2 V with i1 = i and i = j such
that (i1; i2) 2 E, (i2; i3) 2 E,..., and (i 1; i) 2 E.
14A special case of our setting occurs if Sij ' Xi for any i = 1; :::; n and any j 2 N(i). In that case, a players
multilateral strategy xi 2 Xi is assumed to implement the same compound strategy sij = xi in each bilateral game
with neighbor j 2 N(i), so that Xi corresponds to the diagonal in j2N(i)Sij . Settings along these lines have been
considered, in particular, by Sela (1999) and Cai et al. (2016), and will also be used in our examples. Clearly, our
set-up is no less general than those settings.
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chosen by the neighbors of player i is XN(i) = j2N(i)Xj , with typical element xN(i) = fxjgj2N(i).1
A network game (or separable game or polymatrix game) G is an n-player game in which each player2
i = 1; :::; n has strategy set Xi and utility3
ui(xi; x i) = ui(xi; xN(i)) =
X
j2N(i)
uij(sij ; 
i(xj)). (1)
Reecting the local nature of interaction and payo¤s, it will be assumed below that players form4
beliefs about the play of their neighbors only (rather than about the play of all the other players).5
While this assumption is not required for our results, it may be considered somewhat more plausible6
in a learning context.7
We denote by (Xi) the set of mixed multilateral strategies for player i, with typical element8
i. Thus, i is an arbitrary probability distribution on the nite set of pure multilateral strategies9
Xi. Player is payo¤ function ui in the network game extends to mixed multilateral strategies in the10
usual fashion. Specically, if  i denotes the prole of mixed multilateral strategies of all players11
except i, and if N(i) denotes the prole of mixed multilateral strategies for the neighbors of player12
i, then player is expected payo¤ from playing xi 2 Xi is given by ui(i; N(i)) = E[ui(xi; xN(i))] =13
E[ui(xi; x i)], where the expectations are taken with respect to N(i) and  i, respectively. Player14
is mixed best-response correspondence MBRi assigns to any prole N(i) 2 j2N(i)(Xj) the set of15
mixed strategies i 2 (Xi) such that ui(i ; N(i)) = maxi2(Xi) ui(i; N(i)). Further, the mixed16
best-response correspondence MBR of the gameG assigns to any prole  = (1; :::; n) 2 ni=1(Xi)17
the Cartesian product MBR() = ni=1MBRi(N(i)). Since strategy spaces are nite, a mixed-18
strategy Nash equilibrium  = (1; :::; n) exists in the network game by Nashs theorem.19
2.2 Continuous-time ctitious play with independent beliefs20
In the main part of the analysis, we look at the ctitious-play process in continuous time (Rosen-21
müller, 1971). Moreover, consistent with a common interpretation of ctitious play, according to22
which players take it as given that their opponents adhere to some independently chosen mixed23
strategy, we assume that all empirical frequencies are accounted for as marginal distributions only,24
so that beliefs formed by a single player are independent across his opponents. Later, in Section 6,25
this assumption will be relaxed.26
With continuous time, let m : [0;1)! (X1) :::(Xn) be a (measurable) path specifying,27
6
for i = 1; :::; n, player is mixed strategy at time  , i.e., mi() 2 (Xi). As time is continuous,1
averaging over time amounts to integrating each mi over an interval [0;  ], for some  > 0. The2
independent average  : [1;1)! (X1) :::(Xn) of the path m at time   1 is consequently3
dened as4
()  (;m) =

1

Z 
0
m1(
0)d 0; :::;
1

Z 
0
mn(
0)d 0

. (2)
The denition of a continuous-time path of ctitious play reads as follows.5
Denition 1. (CTFP) A continuous-time ctitious play (with independent beliefs) is a measurable6
mapping m : [0;1)! ni=1(Xi) such that m() 2 MBR(()) for all   1.7
The following lemma assures us of the existence of a CTFP learning process. The proof of the lemma8
checks that demanding optimality at all points in time, as this paper does, is equivalent to demanding9
optimality at almost any point in time (Harris, 1998).10
Lemma 1. A CTFP exists.11
Proof. From Harris (1998, p. 244), it is known that a path bm : [0;1) ! ni=1(Xi) exists such12
that bm() 2 MBR((; bm)) for almost all   1. Let Z [1;1) be a null set such that bm() 213
MBR((; bm)) for all  2 [1;1)nZ. Dene now the path m : [0;1) ! ni=1(Xi) by letting14
m() = bm() for any  2 [0;1)nZ, and by letting m() 2 MBR((; bm)) for any  2 Z. Then, for15
any   1, clearly (;m) = (; bm), so that m() 2 MBR((;m)). The claim follows. 16
Next, we dene convergence of ctitious play in a given n-player network game G. Recall that, for17
an arbitrary path m : [0;1)! (X1) :::(Xn), the corresponding averaging path  ! () 18
(;m) is a continuous curve in the space of mixed strategy proles, (X1) :::(Xn). Denote19
by A(m) the set of all accumulation points of the curve (:).15 Convergence of ctitious play is then20
dened by the requirement that A(m) is a subset of the set of Nash equilibria of G.21
Denition 2. A path m : [0;1)! (X1) :::(Xn) is said to converge to Nash equilibrium if22
every limit distribution  2 A(m) is a Nash equilibrium in G.23
15Thus, A(m) consists of all strategy proles that are limit points of some converging sequence of independent
beliefs, f(q)g1q=1, where fqg1q=1 is any sequence in [1;1) such that limq!1 q = 1. Because the set of mixed
strategy proles (X1) :::(Xn) is bounded and closed, there will be at least one such limit point, i.e., A(m) 6= ?.
7
Clearly, a network player that optimizes simultaneously against several opponents behaves di¤erently1
from an unconstrained player in a bilateral game. Sela (1999) has provided a couple of examples2
illustrating the fact that the ctitious-play property in the bilateral games is, indeed, not generally3
informative about the ctitious-play property in the network game. Specically, even if two bilateral4
games have the ctitious-play property, this need not be the case for the network game (poten-5
tially after eliminating weakly dominated strategies). Conversely, even if neither of the bilateral6
games possesses the ctitious-play property, the network game may still possess the ctitious-play7
property.168
3. Zero-sum networks9
Given two players i, j with j 6= i, the bilateral game Gij is called zero-sum if uij + uji  0. By10
a network of zero-sum games, we mean a network game in which each bilateral game is zero-sum.11
More generally, by a zero-sum network, we mean a network game G that is zero-sum as an n-player12
game, i.e., a network game in which u1+ :::+ un  0.17 Related classes of games have been studied,13
in particular, by Bregman and Fokin (1987, 1998), Daskalakis and Papadimitriou (2009), Cai and14
Daskalakis (2011), and Cai et al. (2016). Clearly, if each bilateral game in a given network is zero-15
sum, the network game G is an n-person zero-sum game. However, the converse is not generally16
true. Importantly, even if payo¤s are given in the n-player normal form, there are e¢ cient ways to17
check if the game is a zero-sum network (cf. Cai et al., 2016).18
The following result is the rst main result of the present paper.19
Proposition 1. Fictitious play converges to equilibrium in any zero-sum network.20
Proof. For a given independent prole of mixed strategy beliefs  = (1; :::; n) 2 (X1)  ::: 21
(Xn), let N(i) = fjgj2N(i) 2 j2N(i)(Xj) denote the corresponding independent prole of22
mixed strategies for the neighbors of player i. Dene the Lyapunov function23
L() =
nX
i=1
max
xi2Xi

ui(xi; N(i))  ui(i; N(i))
	
. (3)
Intuitively, this function measures rst each players scope for individual improvement relative to ,24
and then aggregates the result across all n players in the network. Clearly, as a direct consequence25
16For further details, we refer the reader to Sela (1999, Ex. 4 and 6).
17Alternative terminology includes zero-sum polymatrix game and separable zero-sum multiplayer game.
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of the denition, L()  0. Note next that, because the network is zero-sum, an alternative way to1
write the Lyapunov function is2
L() =
nX
i=1
max
xi2Xi
ui(xi; N(i)). (4)
Consider now a continuous-time ctitious play m : [0;1)! (X1) :::(Xn), with independent3
average ()  (;m) at some xed point in time t  1. Then, because mi() is a best response to4
 i() for i 2 f1; :::; ng, and because interactions are bilateral,5
L(()) =
nX
i=1
ui(mi(); N(i)()) (5)
=
nX
i=1
X
j2N(i)
uij(mi(); j()) (6)
=
nX
i=1
X
j2N(i)
mi() Aijj(), (7)
where Aij is the matrix representing player is payo¤s in the bilateral game Gij , i.e.,186
i Aijj  uij(i; j): (8)
Consider now a player i 2 f1; :::; ng. Then, given that mi() is a best response to N(i)(), we have7 P
j2N(i)mi() Aijj() 
P
j2N(i)mi(b) Aijj(), (9)
for any b  1. Adding up across players, and subsequently multiplying through with  , one obtains8
L(()) Pni=1Pj2N(i)mi(b) AijFj(), (10)
where9
Fj() =   j() =
Z 
0
mj(
0)d 0. (11)
Subtracting inequality (10) from the equation10
bL((b)) =Pni=1Pj2N(i)mi(b) AijFj(b), (12)
and subsequently dividing by b    , one arrives at the key inequality11
bL((b))  L(())b    Pni=1Pj2N(i)mi(b) Aij

Fj(b)  Fj()b   

, (13)
for any b >  . By the fundamental theorem of calculus, the di¤erential quotient on the right-hand12
side converges for b !  to mj(), for almost any   1. This shows that for almost any   1,13
18Here and in the sequel, the dot  denotes the scalar product between two vectors.
9
limb!;b>
bL((b))  L(())b    Pni=1Pj2N(i)mi() Aijmj() = 0, (14)
where the equality on the right-hand side reects the zero-sum property of the network. Since L(())1
is continuous, it follows that L(()) is monotone decreasing. Hence, there is a constant C  02
such that L(())  C= for any   1. Noting that the individual terms of the Lyapunov function3
(3) are all positive, we therefore obtain for any player i = 1; :::; n and for any pure strategy xi 2 Xi4
that5
ui(xi; N(i)())  ui(i(); N(i)()) 
C

: (15)
Consider now any accumulation point  2 A(m) of the path (:). Then, taking the limit  ! 16
shows that7
ui(xi; 

N(i))  ui(i ; N(i))  0, (16)
i.e., xi is not a protable deviation for player i. Since i and xi were arbitrary,  is necessarily a8
Nash equilibrium. This proves convergence of CTFP in any zero-sum network. 9
The proof uses the well-known combination of the Lyapunov method and the envelope theorem10
(Hofbauer, 1995; Harris, 1998). Indeed, as equation (12) shows, the expression L(()) corresponds11
to the total (across all players in the network) of the maxima over cumulative payo¤s.But the12
network is zero-sum, so that the sum of instantaneous payo¤s vanishes. Therefore, the rst-order13
change to L(()) must vanish as well. However, the proof provided above is much less technical14
than existing derivations (even in the case of two-player zero-sum games), because no reference is15
made to the approximation theorem nor to directional derivatives.1916
Regarding the rate of convergence, we mention that a minor renement of the proof shows that,17
as in the case of two-person zero-sum games considered by Harris (1998), the rate of convergence in18
payo¤s, i.e., the rate by which the Lyapunov function approaches zero, is precisely 1= .19
Corollary 1. The rate of convergence of CTFP in any zero-sum network game is 1= .20
Proof. For 1 < b <  , the inequality sign in (13) is reversed. Therefore, following the steps of21
19Notably, Proposition 1 provides a proof of existence of a Nash equilibrium in any zero-sum network. However, in
contrast to the case of two-person zero-sum games, this observation does not imply a minmax theorem for zero-sum
networks. For a generalization of the minmax theorem to zero-sum networks, the reader is referred to Cai et al. (2016).
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the proof of Proposition 1, L(()) is seen to be not only monotone decreasing, but also monotone1
increasing, hence constant. 2
The observation that the rate of convergence does not depend on the size of the network may be3
surprising. However, it should be noted that convergence is measured here on the aggregate level.4
That is to say, when the network is large, then the value of the Lyapunov function provides little5
information about the scope of improvement that is feasible for an individual player. Therefore, it6
might indeed take longer in a larger network to reach, say, an "-equilibrium.7
One might conjecture that it is the zero-sum property that drives convergence also in n-player8
games with n  3, and that the network structure of the game is not needed. However, as the9
following example illustrates, this is not the case. I.e., there are multiplayer zero-sum games in10
which CTFP need not converge.11
Example 1. (Three-player zero-sum game) Consider the following game G1 between three12
players:2013
14
Figure 2. The game G1.15
Here, player 1 and player 2 each have three pure strategies, whereas player 3 has just one pure16
strategy. Therefore, to see what happens under either Nash assumptions or ctitious play, player 317
may be safely ignored. But with player 3 eliminated from the game, the two-player game between18
players 1 and 2 is of the Shapley (1964) type, so that nonconvergence obtains.2119
20Here and elsewhere in the paper, payo¤ vectors are arranged diagonally in each box, starting with player 1s payo¤
in the respective upper-left corner.
21That conclusion does not depend on the fact that player 3 has only one strategy. In fact, we have constructed also
an example of a 2  2  2 zero-sum game with a Shapley hexagon, similar to the three-player non-zero-sum example
of Jordan (1993). On a related note, we conjecture that Example 1 as well as the later examples of the present paper
could be made robust by introducing additional strategies for all players.
11
The example shows that the network assumption in Proposition 1 cannot be easily dropped. On the1
other hand, the zero-sum assumption may be relaxed to a certain extent for convergence in network2
games, as will be discussed in the next section.3
4. Additional classes of network games4
4.1 Conicts5
A bilateral game Gij will be called a conict if there exist valuations vij > 0 and vji > 0, success6
functions pij : Sij  Sji ! [0; 1] and pji : Sji  Sij ! [0; 1], as well as cost functions cij : Sij ! R7
and cji : Sji ! R such that8
uij(sij ; sji) = pij(sij ; sji)vij   cij(sij), (17)
uji(sji; sij) = pji(sji; sij)vji   cji(sji), (18)
and9
pij(sij ; sji) + pji(sji; sij) = 1 (19)
hold for any sij 2 Sij and any sji 2 Sji. Examples include probabilistic contests such as the Tullock10
(1980) contest, the Hirshleifer contest (1989), the Lazear-Rosen (1981) tournament, the rst-price all-11
pay auction (Baye et al., 1996), and Colonel Blotto games (Roberson, 2006), to name a few. The class12
of conicts dened above corresponds precisely to the class of strategically zero-sum games (Moulin13
and Vial, 1978). However, we will use the terminology of conict because it is more suggestive and14
also because it allows to make an important distinction (homogeneous vs. heterogeneous valuations)15
that is absent from the original theory but crucially needed below.2216
A network game G will be called a conict network if the bilateral game Gij is a conict for each17
pair (i; j) 2 E. We will say that a conict network has pairwise homogeneous valuations if valuations18
of two players coincide in any pairwise conict, i.e., if vij = vji for any two players i and j with (i; j) 219
E. An example is Franke and Öztürks (2015) transfer network where the net valuations of winning20
a conict are assumed to be identical across players. If valuations are not pairwise homogeneous, we21
will (somewhat loosely) say that the conict network exhibits heterogeneous valuations.22
Proposition 1 can be extended to these additional classes of games as follows.23
22This distinction is similar in spirit to the di¤erence between exact and weighted potential games.
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Proposition 2. Let G be either (i) a conict network with pairwise homogeneous valuations, or1
(ii) an acyclic conict network with heterogeneous valuations. Then, G has the continuous-time2
ctitious-play property.3
Proof. (i) Starting from the conict network G, we construct another network game eG on the same4
graph and with identical strategy sets by letting payo¤s in the bilateral game eGij be given by5
euij(sij ; sji) = uij(sij ; sji)  vij
2
+ cji(sji). (20)
Then, clearly, each player is payo¤s in eG satisfy6
eui(xi; xN(i))  X
j2N(i)
euij(j(xi); i(xj)) = ui(xi; xN(i))  X
j2N(i)
nvij
2
  cji(i(xj))
o
, (21)
which shows that eG is best-response equivalent in mixed strategies to G.23 Moreover, for any pair7
(i; j) 2 E, using (17-19) and vij = vji, we have8
euij(sij ; sji) + euji(sji; sij)
= uij(sij ; sji)  vij
2
+ cji(sji) + uji(sji; sij)  vji
2
+ cij(sij) (22)
= pij(sij ; sji)vij   cij(sij)  vij
2
+ cji(sji) + pji(sji; sij)vji   cji(sji)  vji
2
+ cij(sij) (23)
= 0, (24)
Thus, eG is a network of two-person zero-sum games and, hence, a zero-sum network. By Proposition9
1, CTFP converges in eG. Using the best-response equivalence in mixed strategies, both the set of10
continuous-time ctitious plays and the set of Nash equilibria are the same for G and eG. Hence,11
CTFP converges also in G.12
13
Figure 3. Partitioning the set of nodes in an acyclic network.14
23Two n-player games G and G0 with identical strategy spaces X1; :::; Xn are called best-response equivalent in mixed
strategies (Monderer and Shapley, 1996b) if for any i = 1; ::; n, and any  i 2 1  ::: i 1 i+1  ::: n (or
any  i 2  i), argmaxxi2Xi ui(xi;  i) = argmaxxi2Xi u0i(xi;  i).
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(ii) Without loss of generality, the network may be assumed to be connected. The set of players can1
then be partitioned into a nite number of subsets V0; V1; :::; VK , where i 2 Vk for k 2 f0; :::;Kg if and2
only if the graph-theoretic distance between players 1 and i equals k. See Figure 3 for illustration.3
Thus,4
V0 = f1g, (25)
V1 = N(1), and (26)
Vk+1 = f
[
i2Vk
N(i)gnVk 1 (k = 1; :::;K   1). (27)
We will describe an iterative construction that transforms the conict network with bilateral payo¤5
function uij and heterogeneous valuations vij into a conict network with bilateral payo¤ functions6
buij and homogeneous valuations bvij . For this, we initialize the iteration by letting bu1j = u1j and7
bv1j = v1j for any neighbor j 2 N(1). We start now with k = 1 and consider some player i 2 Vk.8
Since the network is acyclic, there is precisely one player l 2 Vk 1 such that i 2 N(l). We rescale9
player is payo¤ function uij in his relationship with any neighbor j 2 N(i) by letting10
buij(sij ; sji) = bvli
vil
 uij(sjl; slj), (28)
so that player is valuation becomes11
bvij = bvli
vil
 vij . (29)
Since the factor (bvli=vil) does not depend on the neighbor j 2 N(i), such rescaling does not a¤ect12
player js multilateral best-response correspondence. Moreover, the resulting bilateral game bGij13
between players i and j (with payo¤ function buij for player i, and payo¤ function buji for player j) is14
a conict with homogeneous valuations, since bvji = bvij by equation (29). Once this is accomplished15
for any i 2 Vk, the index k is incremented, and the rescaling procedure repeated. After the iteration16
has reached k = K, we end up with a conict network bG with pairwise homogeneous valuations that17
is best-response equivalent in mixed strategies to G. Convergence of CTFP follows, therefore, from18
part (i). 19
The intuition is as follows. If valuations are homogeneous, then each bilateral game is essentially a20
constant-sum game with costly strategies.24 Suppose that the cost of a player in any bilateral conict21
24This useful interpretation is borrowed from Ben-Sasson et al. (2007).
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is not lost, but reaches the other player as a subsidy. Then, as the size of the subsidy does not depend1
on the players choice of strategy, his best-response correspondence remains una¤ected. However,2
if the subsidy is implemented in any bilateral conict, the network game becomes constant-sum,3
and we are done. If valuations are heterogeneous, and the underlying network structure is acyclic,4
then the conict network can be transformed into a conict network with pairwise homogeneous5
valuations by a simple iteration that starts at player 1 and works its way through the tree, where6
in each step, valuations and cost functions of a new set of players are rescaled so as to render the7
backward-looking conict homogeneous.8
However, rescaling does not work in general conict networks. Indeed, as the following example9
illustrates, ctitious play need not converge in cyclic conict networks with heterogeneous valuations.10
Example 2. (Network of conicts) Suppose there are three players i = 1; 2; 3, where X1 = X2 =11
X3 = fL;Hg. The network structure is a triangle. In the network game G2, each bilateral game is a12
conict with heterogeneous valuations. Specically, one assumes13
vi;i+1 = 6, vi;i 1 = 3, (30)
ci;i+1(L) = ci;i 1(L) = 0, ci;i+1(H) = ci;i 1(H) = 1 (31)
pi;i+1(H;L) = 34 , pi;i+1(L;H) =
1
3 , pi;i+1(L;L) = pi;i+1(H;H) =
1
2 , (32)
where i + 1 refers to player 1 if i = 3, and similarly, i   1 refers to player 3 if i = 1. Denote by14
ri = prfxi = Hg the probability that player i uses strategy H. There is a unique Nash equilibrium15
(r1; r2; r3) = (0; 0; 0).25 Moreover, ctitious play need not converge to equilibrium, but may follow a16
triangle-shaped path that runs in a round-robin fashion through the points17
:::! p1 = (27 ; 47 ; 17)! p2 = (17 ; 27 ; 47)! p3 = (47 ; 17 ; 27)! :::, (33)
as illustrated in Figure 4. Thus, the dynamic conict does not settle down, which shows that the18
assumption of homogeneous valuations cannot be dropped unless the network is acyclic.19
25So all players would choose the e¤ort level L.
15
1Figure 4. Fictitious play need not converge in a network of conicts.2
4.2 Potential games3
We introduce notions of increasing exibility rst for bilateral games and then for network games.4
A bilateral game Gij is said to possess identical payo¤ functions if uij(sij ; sji) = uji(sji; sij) for all5
sij 2 Sij and all sji 2 Sji.26 A bilateral game Gij is an exact potential game (Monderer and Shapley,6
1996a) if there exists a potential function Pij : Sij  Sji ! R such that7
uij(sij ; sji)  uij(bsij ; sji) = Pij(sij ; sji)  Pij(bsij ; sji), (34)
uji(sji; sij)  uji(bsji; sij) = Pij(sij ; sji)  Pij(sij ; bsji), (35)
for all sij ; bsij 2 Sij and all sji; bsji 2 Sji. Next, a bilateral game Gij is a weighted potential game8
(Monderer and Shapley, 1996a) if there exists a potential function Pij : Sij  Sji ! R as well as9
weights wij > 0 and wji > 0 such that10
uij(sij ; sji)  uij(bsij ; sji) = wij fPij(sij ; sji)  Pij(bsij ; sji)g , (36)
uji(sji; sij)  uji(bsji; sij) = wji fPij(sij ; sji)  Pij(sij ; bsji)g , (37)
for all sij ; bsij 2 Sij and all sji; bsji 2 Sji.27 A network game G will be said to be an exact potential11
network if all bilateral games Gij are exact potential games. Finally, a network game G will be12
referred to as a weighted potential network if all bilateral games Gij are weighted potential games.13
26A game with identical interests (Monderer and Shapley, 1996b) is a game that is best-response equivalent in mixed
strategies to a game with identical payo¤ functions. Thus, games with identical interests relate to games with identical
payo¤ functions in the same way as strategically zero-sum games relate to zero-sum games.
27The following observation shows that the notation need not lead to confusion: Let Gij be a weighted potential
game with potential Pij and weight wij for player i and weight wji for player j. Dene a potential Pji : SjiSij ! R by
Pji(sji; sij) = Pij(sij ; sji). Then, the bilateral game Gji (i.e., the game Gij with the roles of players i and j exchanged)
is a weighted potential game with potential Pji and weight wji for player j and weight wij for player i.
16
Cai and Daskalakis (2011) have shown that if all bilateral games in a network have identical payo¤1
functions then the network game allows an exact potential (the welfare function). The following result2
applies their reasoning, but also o¤ers some extensions in so far that bilateral games may merely3
be exact potential games or even weighted potential games. We also use a slightly di¤erent proof.4
Specically, we construct the potential of the network game as the sum over all potentials rather5
than as the sum over all payo¤ functions. Moreover, in the case of weighted potential games, we6
employ a similar induction argument as in the proof of Proposition 2(ii).7
Proposition 3. Let G be either (i) an exact potential network, or (ii) a weighted potential network8
on an acyclic graph. Then, G has the continuous-time ctitious-play property.9
Proof. (i) Suppose that the network game G is an exact potential network. Then, since any bilateral10
game Gij is an exact potential game, there exist a potential function Pij : Sij  Sji ! R such that11
uij(sij ; sji)  uij(bsij ; sji) = Pij(sij ; sji)  Pij(bsij ; sji), (38)
uji(sji; sij)  uji(bsji; sij) = Pij(sij ; sji)  Pij(sij ; bsji), (39)
for any sij ; bsij 2 Sij and any sji; bsji 2 Sji. In particular, by exchanging the roles of players i and j12
in equation (39) and comparing with (38), we obtain13
Pij(sij ; sji)  Pij(bsij ; sji) = Pji(sji; sij)  Pji(sji; bsij). (40)
Consider now the aggregate potential P : X ! R dened through14
P(x) = 1
2
X
(i;j)2E
Pij(sij ; sji), (41)
where sij = j(xi) 2 Sij denotes player is bilateral strategy vis-a-vis player j under the multilateral15
strategy xi and, analogously, sji = i(xj) 2 Sji denotes player js bilateral strategy vis-a-vis player i16
under the prole of multilateral strategies x i = (x1; :::; xi 1; xi+1; :::; xn). It is claimed that P is an17
exact potential for G. Indeed, for any xi 2 Xi, bxi 2 Xi, and x i 2 X i, writing bsij = j(bxi) 2 Sij ,18
it is straightforward to check that19
17
ui(xi; x i)  ui(bxi; x i)
=
X
j2N(i)
fuij(sij ; sji)  uij(bsij ; sji)g (42)
=
X
j2N(i)
fPij(sij ; sji)  Pij(bsij ; sji)g (43)
=
1
2
8<: X
(i;j)2E
fPij(sij ; sji)  Pij(bsij ; sji)g+ X
(j;i)2E
fPji(sji; sij)  Pji(sji; bsij)g
9=; (44)
=
1
2
8<: X
(i;j)2E
Pij(sij ; sji) +
X
(j;i)2E
Pji(sji; sij)
9=;  12
8<: X
(i;j)2E
Pij(bsij ; sji) + X
(j;i)2E
Pji(sji; bsij)
9=; (45)
= P(xi; x i)  P(bxi; x i). (46)
Hence, P is indeed an exact potential for the n-player game G. Therefore, from Harris (1998), CTFP1
converges.2
(ii) From the weighted potential network, an exact potential network is constructed as follows.3
First, players are assigned to subsets V0; V1; :::; VK according to their distance k from player 1, as4
in the proof of Proposition 2. Then, we initiate an iteration by letting eu1j = u1j for all j 2 N(1).5
We begin with k = 1. Consider any player j 2 Vk, and recall that there is precisely one player6
i 2 Vk 1 such that j 2 N(i).28 By assumption, the bilateral game Gij is a weighted potential game.7
Therefore, there exists a potential function Pij : SijSji ! R, as well as weights wij > 0 and wji > 08
such that9
uij(sij ; sji)  uij(bsij ; sji) = wij fPij(sij ; sji)  Pij(bsij ; sji)g , (47)
uji(sji; sij)  uji(bsji; sij) = wji fPij(sij ; sji)  Pij(sij ; bsji)g , (48)
for any sij ; bsij 2 Sij and any sji; bsji 2 Sji. Without loss of generality, wij = 1. Given this normal-10
ization, we rescale all bilateral payo¤ functions of player j by letting eujl = ujl=wji, for any l 2 N(j).11
Then, the bilateral game eGij with payo¤ functions euij = uij for player i and euji = uji=wji for player12
j is easily seen to allow the exact potential Pij . Moreover, the linear aggregation of payo¤s implies13
that euj = uj=wji, so that player js best-response correspondence is not a¤ected. In particular,14
any bilateral game Gjl with l 2 N(j)nfig remains a weighted potential game. Once all players15
28Note that this notation di¤ers from the one used in the proof of Proposition 2(ii).
18
j 2 Vk have been dealt with, the running index k is incremented. Clearly, when the iteration ends at1
k = K, the bilateral games eGij form an exact potential network that is best-response equivalent in2
mixed strategies to the weighted potential network we started from. Hence, invoking part (i), CTFP3
converges to equilibrium. 4
The intuition of the rst part is simple. Because bilateral games possess exact potentials, the5
aggregate potential reects incentives precisely as the network game.29 The intuition of the second6
part is very similar to Proposition 2(ii).7
Sela (1999, Prop. 12) has shown that a star-shaped network of generic weighted potential two-8
by-two games is, when reduced to a two-player game, best-response equivalent in mixed strategies to9
a game with identical interests. This implies the ctitious-play property. Proposition 3 shows that10
the one-against-allassumption, the assumption on the number of strategies, and the genericity of11
payo¤s may be dropped without weakening the conclusion.12
The following example shows that a general network consisting of weighted potential games need13
not have the ctitious-play property.14
Example 3. (Network of weighted potential games) Consider the following game G3 between15
three players i = 1; 2; 3, each of them having two compound strategies, i.e., X1 = X2 = X3 = fH;Tg.16
Bilateral payo¤s are specied in Figure 5.17
18
19
Figure 5. A network of weighted potential games.20
Thus, each player is involved in two coordination games, where for player i, coordination with player21
i   1, is more valuable than coordination with player i + 1.30 Moreover, there is a twist in the22
coordination between players 1 and 3. The game G3 allows a unique Nash equilibrium in which each23
29Extending the proof, one can easily convince oneself that arbitrary networks (so-called hypergraphs) of multiplayer
exact potential games possess an exact potential.
30We use the same notational conventions as in the previous example.
19
player randomizes with equal probability over his two alternatives. However, CTFP goes through1
the hexagonal cycle (the entries correspond to the respective probability of playing strategy H)2
:::! p1 = (a; b; c)! p2 = (1  c; a; b)! p3 = (1  b; 1  c; a)! (49)
! p4 = (1  a; 1  b; 1  c)! p5 = (c; 1  a; 1  b)! p6 = (b; c; 1  a)! :::,
where (a; b; c) = (49 ;
8
9 ;
7
9). A numerical ctitious-play path approaching the cycle is illustrated in3
Figure 6.4
5
Figure 6. A network of weighted potential games need not possess the CTFP property.6
4.3 Two-by-two games7
Finally, we consider two-by-two games, i.e., two-player games in which each player has just two8
strategies.31 It will be recalled (e.g., Krishna and Sjöström, 1997, Prop. 3) that any two-by-two9
game without weakly dominated strategies is best-response equivalent in mixed strategies to either10
a zero-sum game or to a game with identical payo¤ functions. Miyasawas theorem is therefore11
customarily presented as a corollary of the corresponding results for zero-sum and identical interest12
games. Similarly, our network generalization of Miyasawas theorem will be derived as an implication13
of our respective results for conict and potential networks.14
A network game G will be called a network of strategically similar two-by-two games if (i) Xi has15
precisely two elements, for any i 2 f1; :::; ng, and (ii) either all bilateral games Gij are conicts with16
pairwise homogeneous valuations, or all bilateral games Gij allow an exact potential.17
31Miyasawa (1961) has shown that every two-by-two game has the ctitious-play property. That result was later
seen to depend on a particular tie-breaking rule (Monderer and Sela, 1996). With generic payo¤s, however, the theorem
holds. For further discussion of this important special case, see Metrick and Polak (1994) and Sela (1999).
20
Proposition 4. Let G be a network of strategically similar two-by-two games. Then, G has the1
continuous-time ctitious-play property.2
Proof. Immediate from Propositions 2 and 3. 3
Proposition 4 extends Miyasawas theorem to arbitrary network structures. As seen above in Propo-4
sitions 2 and 3, the assumptions on the bilateral games can be further relaxed when the underlying5
network structure is acyclic. This implies, in particular, a related result by Sela (1999, Cor. 13)6
for star-shaped networks. However, Example 2 above shows that it is not possible to generalize7
Proposition 4 to arbitrary networks of strategically zero-sum games. Neither is it possible, in view8
of Example 3, to extend the result to arbitrary networks of weighted potential games.329
5. Discrete-time ctitious play10
While the continuous-time variant of ctitious play considered above is analytically more convenient,11
there are reasons to be interested also in the discrete-time variant. For instance, the rst major12
result in the literature by Robinson (1951) concerned the discrete-time process in two-person zero-13
sum games. It has often been suggested that the two processes should behave similarly. This is also14
intuitive because the incremental changes in the discrete time process become smaller and smaller15
over time. Harris (1998) has developed a very useful approach that, indeed, allows transferring16
results for the continuous-time case to the discrete-time case. Below, we will exploit his arguments17
to extend some of our conclusions to the case of discrete-time ctitious play.3318
In contrast to the analysis so far, time progresses now in stages. In each stage t 2 N = f1; 2; 3; :::g,19
each player i 2 f1; :::; ng chooses a pure multilateral strategy xi(t) 2 Xi. The initial strategy prole20
x(0) 2 X is considered given. Then, the empirical frequencies of pure-strategy choices made before21
stage t are reected in the (discrete independent) average22
d(t)  d(t; x(:)) =
 
1
t
t 1X
t0=0
x1(t
0); :::;
1
t
t 1X
t0=0
xn(t
0)
!
(t = 1; 2; 3; :::). (50)
32Similarly, it does not seem possible to obtain a general convergence result in mixed networks, i.e., networks where
some edge games are zero-sum, while others reect identical interests.
33The idea is it to make a simple change in the time scale, such that the di¤erential inclusion dening the continuous-
time process becomes autonomous and, in fact, equivalent to the best-response population dynamics, as in Gilboa and
Matsui (1991) and Matsui (1992). Thereby, it is feasible to exploit the near-convergence of a su¢ ciently delayed
discrete-time process. As discussed in Hofbauer and Sorin (2006), that method of proof extends to arbitrary nite
n-player games in which ctitious play converges uniformly across initial conditions. As we have seen in Corollary 1,
the class of zero-sum networks satises this condition.
21
For a mixed strategy prole  2 (X1) :::(Xn), we denote by BR() = MBR() \X the set1
of best-response proles to  that consist of pure strategies only.2
Denition 3 (DTFP). A discrete-time ctitious play in the network game G is a sequence of3
multilateral pure-strategy proles x(:) = fx(t)g1t=1 such that x(t) 2 BR(d(t)) for all t 2 N.4
For a given DTFP x(:) = fx(t)g1t=1, the corresponding sequence of averages, dened through d(t) =5
d(t; x(:)), is a sequence in (X1) :::(Xn). We denote by Ad(x(:)) the set of all accumulation6
points of fd(t)g1t=1.7
Denition 4. A sequence of multilateral pure-strategy proles x(:) = fx(t)g1t=1 is said to converge8
to equilibrium if any accumulation point  2 Ad(x(:)) of the corresponding process of discrete-time9
averages fd(t)g1t=1 is a Nash equilibrium in G.10
The following result generalizes Robinsons (1951) theorem to n-player zero-sum networks.11
Proposition 5. Let G be an arbitrary zero-sum network. Then any discrete-time ctitious play in12
G converges to equilibrium.13
Proof. Take any DTFP x(:) = fx(t)g1t=1 in G, and consider the associated process of discrete14
averages dened through d(t) = d(t; x(:)). Then, for any i = 1; :::; n,15
di (t) =
1
t
t 1X
t0=0
xi(t
0) (t = 1; 2; 3; :::). (51)
By simple algebraic manipulation,16
di (t+ 1) =
1
t+ 1
tX
t0=0
xi(t
0) =
1
t+ 1
xi(t) +
1
t+ 1
t 1X
t0=0
xi(t
0) =
1
t+ 1
xi(t) +
t
t+ 1
di (t). (52)
Hence, recalling that xi(t) 2 BRi(dN(i)(t))  MBRi(dN(i)(t)), the process of averages satises17
di (t+ 1) 2
1
t+ 1
MBRi(dN(i)(t)) +
t
t+ 1
di (t) (i 2 f1; :::; ng, t = 1; 2; 3; :::). (53)
By Corollary 1, there exists  such that any solution of the autonomous di¤erential inclusion18
@
@ ln 
2a.e. MBR()   (54)
starting anywhere at  = 1 is "-close to the set of Nash equilibria of G from time  onwards. Clearly,19
the correspondence MBR is u.s.c., compact-, and convex-valued. Applying now Hofbauer and Sorin20
22
(2006, Prop. 7), it follows that there exists t such that d(t) is "-close to the set of Nash equilibria1
of G from time t onwards. Hence, any accumulation point of the sequence fd(t)g1t=1 is a Nash2
equilibrium, which proves the proposition. 3
Proposition 5 extends Selas (1999, Prop. 7) result for star-shaped networks of zero-sum games in4
three ways. First, the restriction regarding the network structure is dropped. Second, Proposition 55
imposes the zero-sum assumption only on the network, rather than on each of the bilateral games. Fi-6
nally, no assumptions regarding tie-breaking are used here. In sum, it is feasible to address additional7
applications such as security games (Cai et al., 2016) and, as has been seen, conict networks.8
As in the case of two-player zero-sum games, the transformation of the DTFP process into a9
continuous-time process that is closeto a CTFP process comes at a cost, which is the slower rate10
of convergence. More specically, the discrete-time process is known to overshoot,which makes it11
generally hard to nail down the rate of convergence of the discrete process. For two-player zero-sum12
games, Robinsons proof allows to derive an upper bound for the rate of convergence (Shapiro, 1958).13
The resulting estimate is of the order O(t 1=(1+2 2)), where i is the number of strategies for player14
i = 1; 2. If the game is symmetric, and consequently both players have the same number of strategies15
1 = 2  , the upper bound may be sharpened to O(t 1=( 1)). Given the lack of a direct extension16
of Robinsons proof to zero-sum networks, however, that upper bound is not easily generalized to17
zero-sum networks. Improving on Shapiros upper bound, Karlins strong conjecture says (or more18
precisely, said) that DTFP converges at rate O(t 1=2) in two-person zero-sum games, regardless of19
the number of strategies. Daskalakis and Pan (2014) have recently disproved that conjecture, showing20
that the rate of convergence in an asymmetric two-player zero-sum game in which both players have21
the same number of strategies  may be as low as O(t 1=). That lower bound holds, obviously, also22
for zero-sum networks.3423
The so-called Rosy Theoremof Monderer et al. (1997) says that, in DTFP, a players expected24
payo¤s at any given stage are weakly higher than his average payo¤ experience. Using Robinsons25
(1951) theorem on the convergence of DTFP in two-player zero-sum games, it can be concluded that26
every DTFP in a two-person zero-sum game is belief-a¢ rming, which means here that a players27
average payo¤ experience converges against his value of the game. It is tempting to suggest that28
34For related work, see Gjerstad (1996), Conitzer (2009), and Brandt et al. (2013).
23
an extension to zero-sum network games is feasible. However, Nash equilibrium payo¤s are not1
necessarily unique in zero-sum networks (cf. Cai et al., 2016). Thus, even though the Rosy Theorem2
holds for zero-sum networks, the average payo¤ experience of an individual player may vary as much3
as his equilibrium payo¤. Hence, Monderer et al. (1997, Th. B), which states an equality between a4
players long-run payo¤ experience and the value of the game in two-player zero-sum games, cannot5
be easily generalized to zero-sum networks.6
Cai and Daskalakis (2011) have shown that, if every node in a separable multiplayer game plays7
a no-regret sequence of pure strategies in discrete time, then the resulting frequency distributions of8
pure strategies ultimately form an "-equilibrium. No-regret is a property that is less stringent than9
being belief-a¢ rming. Specically, under no-regret learning, a players expected payo¤s are assumed10
to be asymptotically weakly below his average payo¤ experience, while in a belief-a¢ rming process11
like ctitious play in two-person zero-sum games, a players expected payo¤s are asymptotically even12
equal to his average payo¤ experience. In other words, by combining the conclusions of Robinsons13
theorem and Monderer et al. (1997, Th. B), DTFP in two-player zero-sum games is recognized as14
a no-regret learning algorithm. There is, consequently, no simple way to deduce Proposition 5 from15
the existing literature.16
The following should now be immediate.17
Corollary 2. Let G be a network game that satises the assumptions of any of the Propositions 118
through 4. Then any DTFP process in G converges to equilibrium.19
Proof. For zero-sum networks, the claim follows from Proposition 5. Since conict networks with20
pairwise homogeneous valuations, and also acyclic conict networks with heterogeneous valuations21
are best-response equivalent in mixed strategies to zero-sum networks, the claim holds also for these22
classes of network games. Regarding exact bilateral potential games, it was shown above that the23
corresponding network game allows an exact potential. Hence, the claim follows in this case from24
Monderer and Shapley (1996a, 1996b). Finally, to deal with weighted potential networks on acyclic25
graphs, it su¢ ces to recall the best-response equivalence in mixed strategies to an exact potential26
network. 27
24
6. The case of joint beliefs1
Above, it was assumed that each player is beliefs about his opponentsplay are independent across2
opponents. However, in a network with more than two players, a player might observe correlations3
between the behavior of two or more of his neighbors.35 We will therefore explore in this section the4
implications of assuming that players take account of such correlations when deciding about their5
best responses.6
Let eN(i) 2 (XN(i)) be player is joint belief over strategies chosen by his neighbors, where the7
tilde indicates that correlation is feasible. Player is expected payo¤ from player xi 2 Xi is written8
as ui(xi; eN(i)) = E[ui(xi; xN(i))], where the expectation is taken with respect to eN(i). Player is9
mixed best-response correspondence MBRi extends as usual to joint beliefs, eN(i) 2 (XN(i)), in10
the sense that MBRi(eN(i)) is the set of mixed strategies i 2 (Xi) such that ui(i ; eN(i)) =11
maxi2(Xi) ui(i; eN(i)). Similarly, the mixed best-response correspondence MBR of G extends12
to arbitrary probability distributions e 2 (X) by assigning the Cartesian product MBR(e) =13
ni=1MBRi(eN(i)), where eN(i) denotes then the marginal of e on XN(i). Let m : [0;1)! (X1)14
:::(Xn) be a measurable path specifying each player is mixed strategy at any time  . Then the15
continuous-time joint average e is dened as16
e()  e(;m) = 1

Z 
0
m( 0)d 0 (  1), (55)
where the integral is now taken in (X). Similarly, if fx(t)g1t=0 is a sequence in ni=1(Xi), we may17
dene the discrete-time joint average ed as18
ed(t)  ed(t; x(:)) = 1
t  1
t 1X
t0=0
x(t0) (t = 1; 2; 3; :::), (56)
where the sum is again taken in (X). The following denition of joint ctitious play should contain19
no surprises.20
Denition 5. (C^TFP, D^TFP) A continuous-time ctitious play with joint beliefs is a measurable21
mapping m : [0;1) ! ni=1(Xi) such that m() 2 MBR(e()) for any   1.36 Similarly, a22
35 Indeed, correlation of the limit prole is a well-documented possibility (Young, 1993; Fudenberg and Kreps, 1993;
Jordan, 1993; Fudenberg and Levine, 1998).
36Adapting the proof of Harris (1998), existence of a C^TFP can be veried for any n-player game. For network
games, however, existence follows more easily from the proof of Proposition 6 below.
25
discrete-time ctitious play with joint beliefs is a sequence fx(t)g1t=0 in ni=1(Xi) such that x(t) 21
BR(ed(t)) for any t 2 N.2
The denition of convergence is adapted as follows. Denote by eA(m) and eAd(x(:)), respectively, the3
set of all accumulation points of e(:) and ed(:). We will say that e 2 (X) is an observational4
equilibrium when, for each player i = 1; :::; n, player is marginal distribution ei 2 (Xi) is a mixed5
best response to the marginal eN(i) 2 (XN(i)), i.e., when ui(xi; eN(i))  ui(ei ; eN(i)) for any6
player i = 1; :::; n and for any strategy xi 2 Xi.37 We will further say that a path m, or a sequence7
x(:), converges observationally to Nash if any e 2 eA(m), or e 2 eAd(x(:)), is an observational8
equilibrium.9
In the proof of the following result, we generalizes an insight of Sela (1999, Lemma 1) to arbitrary10
networks, and apply it to the present situation.11
Proposition 6. Let G be an arbitrary network game satisfying assumptions of any of the Proposi-12
tions 1 through 4. Then any C^TFP, and likewise any D^TFP, converges observationally to Nash.13
Proof. Because interactions are bilateral, and linear expectations ignore correlations, expected14
payo¤s satisfy15
ui(i; eN(i)) = X
j2N(i)
uij(i; j), (57)
for any player i = 1; :::; n. Therefore, if e 2 (X) is a probability distribution over pure strategy16
proles in G, and if  2 (X1)  :::  (Xn) is the corresponding prole composed of marginal17
distributions, then MBR(e) = MBR(). The claim follows. 18
Intuitively, correlation is irrelevant for the best-response correspondence in a network gameG because19
all interactions are bilateral. As a consequence, a path m is a CTFP if and only if it is a C^TFP,20
and a sequence x(:) is a DTFP if and only if it is a D^TFP. Therefore, in the considered class of21
network games, ctitious play with joint beliefs converges to a potentially correlated prole in which22
each players marginal distribution is a best response to the marginal distribution, formed either23
independently or jointly, of his neighbors mixed strategies.24
37For example, it follows from the analysis of Cai et al. (2016) that any coarse correlated equilibrium in a zero-sum
network is an observational equilibrium.
26
7. Concluding remarks1
In this paper, we have identied new and large classes of network games with the ctitious-play2
property. Using entirely elementary arguments, we have derived simple and natural conditions on3
either bilateral payo¤s or on the network structure su¢ cient to guarantee convergence of the naive4
learning procedure even when a players decisions across bilateral games are interdependent. We5
have also constructed several examples of multiplayer games that show that these conditions cannot6
be easily relaxed.7
Applications of our results are manifold and include security games, conict networks, and decen-8
tralized wireless channel selection, for instance. Our ndings conrm the intuition that equilibrium9
behavior in important types of social interaction can be reached without assuming strong forms of10
economic rationality.11
Our results on the discrete-time variant of ctitious play entail, in particular, a substantial exten-12
sion of Robinsons (1951) classic result. This might serve as a basis for further analysis and simulation13
exercises. Our derivation also provides an additional illustration of the intimate relationship between14
the continuous-time and the discrete-time processes that has been suggested in many studies.15
We did not address all open issues on ctitious play in network games. For instance, we did not16
examine stochastic ctitious play. It should be noted, however, that the convergence of stochastic17
ctitious play follows directly from our results for networks of exact potential games and, similarly,18
for acyclic networks of weighted potential games. Moreover, we conjecture that the techniques devel-19
oped by Hofbauer and Sandholm (2002) apply also to the zero-sum networks and conict networks20
discussed in the present paper.21
Last but not least, there is some recent work that digs deeply into the di¤erential topology and22
projective geometry of ctitious-play paths in two-person zero-sum games (van Strien, 2011; Berger,23
2012). Exploring the potentially interesting implications of such approaches for zero-sum network24
games remains, however, beyond the scope of the present study.3825
38Further, one might want to seek conditions that ensure that the results of the present paper continue to hold if
all bilateral games are dominance solvable (Milgrom and Roberts, 1991) or exhibit strategic complementarities and
diminishing returns (Krishna, 1992; Berger, 2008). However, as discussed in Sela (1999), this last route seems less
promising because interdependencies between choices in bilateral games undermine such structural properties of the
bilateral games.
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Appendix (not for publication): Details on Examples 2 and 31
Details on Example 2. Payo¤s in the bilateral conict Gi;i+1, where i 2 f1; 2; 3g, are shown in2
the left panel of Figure 7.3
4
Figure 7. Bilateral payo¤s (left panel), and the normal form representation of G2 (right panel).5
Lemma A.1. The best-response correspondence in G2 may be described as follows: Player i 2 f1; 2; 3g6
optimally chooses H if ri 1   2ri+1  0; player i optimally chooses L if ri 1   2ri+1  0.7
Proof. Looking at bilateral payo¤s, one notes that8
ui(H; ri+1; ri 1)  ui(L; ri+1; ri 1)
= ui;i+1(H; ri+1)  ui;i+1(L; ri+1) + ui;i 1(H; ri 1)  ui;i 1(L; ri 1) (58)
= ri+1  0 + (1  ri+1)  12 + ri 1  ( 14) + (1  ri 1)  ( 12) (59)
= 14(ri 1   2ri+1). (60)
The claim follows. 9
Lemma A.2. The game G2 has a unique Nash equilibrium, that is given by (r1; r2; r3) = (0; 0; 0).10
Proof. One easily checks that G2 has the payo¤s shown in the right panel of Figure 7. Clearly,11
(L;L;L) is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in G2. Next, we show that the equilibrium is unique.12
Suppose rst that there is a completely mixed-strategy equilibrium (r1; r2; r3). Then, it follows13
from Lemma A.1 that r3   2r2 = 0, r1   2r3 = 0, and r2   2r1 = 0. But the sole solution of14
this system is (r1; r2; r3) = (0; 0; 0). Hence, G2 does not allow a completely mixed equilibrium.15
Moreover, if another equilibrium exists, at least one player must choose a pure strategy. Without16
loss of generality, suppose that this is player 3. Assume rst that r3 = 1, so that player 3 chooses17
H. Then the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies implies that player 2 chooses L and18
33
that player 1 chooses H, but then player 3 would want to deviate to x3 = L. Conversely, assume1
that player 3 chooses L. In this case, if r1 > 0, then player 2 chooses H and consequently r1 = 0,2
which is impossible. If, however, player 1 chooses L with probability one, then player 3 would want3
to deviate unless also player 2 chooses L with probability one. But that only brings us back to4
(r1; r2; r3) = (0; 0; 0). This proves uniqueness, and hence, the lemma. 5
Next, recall the coordinates of the points at which the process changes its direction:6
:::! p1 = (27 ; 47 ; 17)! p2 = (17 ; 27 ; 47)! p3 = (47 ; 17 ; 27)! :::, (61)
The following lemma shows that this process is indeed a stable cycle.7
Lemma A.3. (i) At pi, with i 2 f1; 2; 3g, player i optimally chooses L, while players i  1 and i+ 18
are both indi¤erent. (ii) There is a  > 1 such that9
(p1   (0; 1; 0)) = p3   (0; 1; 0), (62)
(p2   (0; 0; 1)) = p1   (0; 0; 1), (63)
(p3   (1; 0; 0)) = p2   (1; 0; 0). (64)
Proof. (i) From Lemma A.1, player 1 optimally chooses L if r3   2r2  0. But, at p1 = (27 ; 47 ; 17), we10
even have r3   2r2 =  1 < 0. Moreover, players 2 and 3 are indi¤erent at p1 because r1   2r3 = 011
and r2   2r1 = 0. The analysis of the points p2 and p3 follows by symmetry. This proves the rst12
claim. (ii) Note that with  = 2 > 1,13
(p1   (0; 0; 1)) = 2  (27 ; 17 ; 37) = (47 ; 27 ; 67) = p3   (0; 0; 1): (65)
The other two equations follow, again, by symmetry. This proves the second claim, and hence, the14
lemma. 15
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Details on Example 3. The payo¤ matrix of G3 looks as follows:1
2
Figure 8. The game G3.3
Lemma A.4. The best-response correspondence in G3 is given as follows: Player 1 optimally chooses4
H if 5r3 r2  2; he optimally chooses T if 5r3 r2  2. Player 2 optimally chooses H if 5r1+r3  3;5
he optimally chooses T if 5r1 + r3  3. Player 3 optimally chooses H if 5r2   r1  2; he optimally6
chooses T if 5r2   r1  2.7
Proof. As for player 1, one notes that8
u1(H; r2; r3)  u1(T; r2; r3)
= r2r3  ( 4) + (1  r2)r3  ( 6) + r2(1  r3)  6 + (1  r2)(1  r3)  4 (66)
= 4 + 2r2   10r3. (67)
This proves the claim regarding player 1. Similarly,9
u2(r1;H; r3)  u2(r1;T; r3)
= r1r3  6 + (1  r1)r3  ( 4) + r1(1  r3)  4 + (1  r1)(1  r3)  ( 6) (68)
=  6 + 10r1 + 2r3, (69)
proving the claim regarding player 2. Finally,10
u3(r1; r2;H)  u3(r1; r2;T)
= r1r2  4 + (1  r1)r2  6 + r1(1  r2)  ( 6) + (1  r1)(1  r2)  ( 4) (70)
= 4  2r1 + 10r2. (71)
This proves the nal claim, and hence, the lemma. 11
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Lemma A.5. The game G3 has a unique Nash equilibrium, that is given by (r1; r2; r3) = (
1
2 ;
1
2 ;
1
2):1
Proof. Suppose rst that player 1 chooses H with probability one. Then, by iterated elimination of2
strictly dominated strategies, player 2 chooses H, and so does player 3. But then, player 1 would3
deviate to T. Suppose next that player 1 chooses T with probability one. Then, by the iterated4
elimination of strictly dominated strategies, player 2 chooses T, and so does player 3. But then5
player 1 would deviate to H. Thus, there is no equilibrium in which player 1 plays a pure strategy.6
Thus, r1 2 (0; 1), and by Lemma 3.A, 5r3   r2 = 2. Clearly, this precludes r3 = 0 and r3 = 1,7
so that also player 3 must randomize. By Lemma 3.A, 5r2   r1 = 2. But this excludes r2 = 08
and r2 = 1. Hence, any equilibrium is necessarily completely mixed. There is a unique completely9
mixed equilibrium, because the system of indi¤erence relationships  r2 +5r3 = 2, 5r1 + r3 = 3, and10
 r1 + 5r2 = 2 has the unique solution (r1; r2; r3) = (12 ; 12 ; 12). 11
Recall the cycle12
:::! p1 = (a; b; c)! p2 = (1  c; a; b)! p3 = (1  b; 1  c; a)! (72)
! p4 = (1  a; 1  b; 1  c)! p5 = (c; 1  a; 1  b)! p6 = (b; c; 1  a)! :::,
where (a; b; c) = (49 ;
8
9 ;
7
9). The following two lemmas show that the cyclic process is indeed a13
continuous-time ctitious play.14
Lemma A.6. (i) At p1, players 1 optimally chooses T, player 2 is indi¤erent, and player 3 optimally15
chooses H. (ii) At p2, players 1 and 2 optimally choose T, whereas player 3 is indi¤erent. (iii) At16
p3, player 1 is indi¤erent, while players 2 and 3 optimally choose T. (iv) At p4, player 1 optimally17
chooses H, player 2 is indi¤erent, and player 3 optimally chooses T. (v) At p5, players 1 and 218
optimally choose H, whereas player 3 is indi¤erent. (vi) At p6, player 1 is indi¤erent, while players19
2 and 3 optimally choose H.20
Proof. (i) By Lemma A.4, player 1 optimally chooses T if 5r3   r2  2. But, at p1 = (a; b; c) =21
(49 ;
8
9 ;
7
9), we even have 5r3 r2 = 3 > 1. Next, player 2 is indi¤erent if 5r1+r3 = 3. But this is true at22
p1. Finally, player 3 optimally chooses H if 5r2   r1  2. But, at p1, we even have 5r2   r1 = 4 > 1.23
(ii) Player 1 optimally chooses T if 5r3   r2  2. But, at p2 = (1   c; a; b) = (29 ; 49 ; 89), we even24
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have 5r3   r2 = 4 > 1. Next, player 2 optimally choses T if 5r1 + r3  3. But, at p2, we even have1
5r1+r3 = 2 < 3. Finally, player 3 is indi¤erent if 5r2 r1 = 2. And at p2, we indeed have 5r2 r1 = 2.2
(iii) Player 1 is indi¤erent if 5r3   r2 = 2. And indeed, at p3 = (1  b; 1  c; a) = (19 ; 29 ; 49), we have3
5r3  r2 = 2. Player 2 optimally choses T if 5r1+ r3  3. But, at p3, we even have 5r1+ r3 = 1 < 3.4
Finally, player 3 optimally chooses T if 5r2   r1  2. But, at p3, we even have 5r2   r1 = 1 < 2.5
(iv) Player 1 optimally chooses H if 5r3   r2  2. But, at p4 = (1   a; 1   b; 1   c) = (59 ; 19 ; 29), we6
even have 5r3   r2 = 1 < 2. Next, player 2 is indi¤erent if 5r1 + r3 = 3. But this is true at p4.7
Finally, player 3 optimally chooses T if 5r2   r1  2. But, at p4, we even have 5r2   r1 = 0 < 1.8
(ii) Player 1 optimally chooses H if 5r3   r2  2. But, at p5 = (c; 1   a; 1   b) = (79 ; 59 ; 19), we even9
have 5r3   r2 = 0 < 2. Next, player 2 optimally choses H if 5r1 + r3  3. But, at p5, we even have10
5r1 + r3 = 4 > 3. Finally, player 3 is indi¤erent if 5r2   r1 = 2. And at p5, we indeed have this.11
(iii) Player 1 is indi¤erent if 5r3   r2 = 2. And indeed, at p6 = (b; c; 1  a) = (89 ; 79 ; 59), we have this.12
Player 2 optimally choses H if 5r1 + r3  3. But, at p6, we even have 5r1 + r3 = 5 > 3. Finally,13
player 3 optimally chooses H if 5r2  r1  2. But, at p6, we even have 5r2  r1 = 3 > 2. This proves14
the last claim and therefore the lemma. 15
Lemma A.7. There is a  > 1 such that16
(p2   (0; 0; 1)) = p1   (0; 0; 1) (73)
p3 = p2 (74)
(p4   (1; 0; 0)) = p3   (1; 0; 0) (75)
(p5   (1; 1; 0)) = p4   (1; 1; 0) (76)
(p6   (1; 1; 1)) = p5   (1; 1; 1) (77)
(p1   (0; 1; 1)) = p6   (0; 1; 1). (78)
Proof. One can easily verify that equations (73-78) are satised for  = 2. 17
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